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Abstract 
“The function of Rhetoric, then, is to deal with things about which we deliberate, but for which we have no systematic rules.” 
(Aristotle: Rhetoric). If we substitute the word ‘Design’ for the word ‘Rhetoric’ this statement could be the introduction to a text 
on design theory. This paper puts forward the view that a parallel can be drawn between rhetoric, design and TRIZ in particular. 
Aristotle taught that rhetorical communication involved three components: the speaker, the audience, and the speech itself. The 
paper goes on to describe briefly the system of Aristotle's Rhetoric in order to give some insights into the parallel. A prominent 
part of rhetoric is Invention. This has been variously interpreted at different times as the discovery of ways of persuading the 
audience of the speaker's point of view, or alternatively, the discovery of ways of improving mutual understanding between them. 
There is a clear parallel with design. The paper suggests that the conceptual and check-list structure of TRIZ may be seen to 
resemble some of the technical and other aspects of rhetoric, yielding what might be termed a rhetoric of TRIZ. 
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1. Introduction 
The word ‘rhetoric’ has come to mean showy or florid, often misleading, language. In this paper it is used in its 
strict meaning of the art of discovering the means of persuading an audience to agree with a speaker’s point of view, 
including the associated techniques that were first elaborated in antiquity.  In spite of a ‘bad press’ in recent 
centuries, the teaching of rhetoric has persisted in the areas of English composition and Law right up to the present 
day, admittedly in an attenuated form. In fact it has recently had something of a revival. 
The evolution of the Greek ʌȠȜȚȢ (polis) or city-state of the fifth century BC was unprecedented. The polis was a 
small, politically independent, democratic state. Centred around the Aegean Sea there developed an enormous 
number of these ʌȠȜİȚȢ with what we would now regard as very small populations. When a polis grew too big, 
group of its citizens would leave the ȝȘĲȡȠʌȠȜȚȢ (metropolis) or mother-city and found a colony elsewhere. Kitto 
(1951, p66) says that only three had a population of more than 20,000 citizens, i.e. adult male citizens, excluding 
women, children, slaves and foreigners. 
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How this may have come about is not clear. Kitto explains it as follows. The typical Greek citizen was a farmer 
who preferred to live in the town and walk out to work in the field, spending his leisure talking in the town or village 
square. The physical geography of Greece made the transport of goods difficult. There was therefore no great 
economic interdependence strong enough to overcome the desire to live in small communities. According to Kitto, 
the gods,  
“arranged for the Greeks to have the eastern Mediterranean almost to themselves long enough to 
work out what was almost a laboratory experiment to test how far, and in what conditions, human 
nature is capable of creating and sustaining a civilization.  … Therefore this lively and intelligent 
Greek people was for some centuries allowed to live under the apparently absurd system which suited 
and developed its genius … and made it what afterwards became, a race of brilliant individuals and 
opportunists.” (Kitto, pp69/70)  
This produced the conditions for the birth of įȘȝȠțȡĮĲȓĮ (demokratia) or democracy, that is, ‘people-rule.’ 
People made decisions in town meetings. Everyone could speak and vote. 
2. Rhetoric: the technology of persuasion 
In this kind of society, where decisions were made as a result of public discussion, meetings and speeches it is 
easy to see why the art of rhetoric developed. For an individual it was very important to be able to make good 
speeches in order to convince others of his point of view. Rhetoric had first received systematic study in the Greek 
city-states of Sicily after the fall of the tyrants there (Burn, 1966, p250). The methodology, brought to Athens in 
427BC by Gorgias, became a central part of every Athenian’s education. Numerous books were written on the 
subject which was perfected by Aristotle.  
Briefly, three categories of rhetoric evolved, each with a distinct function: 
y  Judicial:   for judging past actions  
y Deliberative:   for deciding future actions 
y Epideictic:   for praising the virtuous or blaming wrongdoers 
In each case there is a speaker, an audience to be convinced and an argument. Aristotle identified three aspects of 
persuasion which should be considered in getting an audience to agree with the speaker’s point of view. The ’HTR9 
(ethos) of a speaker referred to his character or standing and credibility. Then as now the ethos of a speaker was a 
critical success factor. The ORJR9 (logos) was the argument employed. Arguments were carefully chosen from a 
structured array of prepared strategies. Finally the SDTR9 (pathos) of the audience was its degree of receptiveness to 
emotional appeals to their sense of loyalty, sympathy, fairness and so forth. The successful ‘ȡȘĲȦȡ (rhétór) or orator 
would convince the listeners through the conscious and simultaneous targeting of all three persuasive aspects.  
’HTR9 (ethos) 
It is essential to the design process that the client trust the designer to satisfy his wishes. There are some 
designers who have a great deal of credibility with certain audiences, whose names are household words even. The 
’HTR9 (ethos) of a designer can be considered to be his broad reputation and standing. People assume that if an 
object has been designed by a famous designer then it must be good. People will pay more for a ‘designer’ watch. 
Every city with pretensions to being ‘world-class’ should have a gallery or museum designed by a member of an 
elite group of famous architects. The client wants some of the mystique that the famous designer exudes. 
Interestingly, a strong reputation also inhibits criticism: it takes courage to suggest that the Emperor has no clothes. 
The audience or user needs are often forgotten.   
This straightforward formulation does not apply in some circumstances: competitions and forgeries. In 
architectural competitions the designer’s identity is kept hidden. Each anonymous entry has to convince a “jury” that 
it is the best design. The “jury” normally contains people of high, possibly international, standing. These 
competitions may also have separate “technical assessors,” who make sure that the winning design is technically 
viable, in case the great and the good of the “jury” should choose a design that turns out to be deficient. The winning 
design then assumes the collective ethos of the “jury.”   
In the rhetoric of forgery, people try to impress others by wearing a fake Rolex watch, for example. Here is a 
form of communication that is false but still serves its purpose precisely.  
ORJR9 (logos) 
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People will naturally evaluate a design before buying it. Consumers make comparisons. The fashion-conscious 
have a list of “must-have” brands for personal items such as trainers and clothing. Manufacturers go to great lengths 
to create brand loyalty. Where something cannot be bought in the market some procurement method has to be 
followed, as in the case of architecture and space travel. In all these cases people become convinced that they want a 
particular product. The various forms of communication and persuasion that bring about this conviction constitute 
the ORJR9 (logos).   
Obviously this does not automatically equate to logical thinking or objective truth as the space shuttle disaster 
showed. There have been a great many cases where an architect’s client trusted him to produce a satisfactory design, 
only to be disappointed with the result, as studies have shown (Ó Catháin, 2003). 
SDTR9 (pathos) 
From the original meaning, “to suffer,” this is the passion or susceptibility of the consumer or client. Fashion 
‘victims’ epitomise this aspect of design. Other manifestations exist also, for example people’s desire to have the 
latest mobile phone or other gadget. People can be convinced by an appeal to their emotions to buy or accept 
something unsuitable. In the United Kingdom consumer law allows for a “cooling off period” that, for a short time 
after a purchase is made, lets people change their mind about certain kinds of purchase. In architecture it is not 
uncommon for clients to be persuaded to accept design proposals that sacrifice their emotional needs to those of the 
architect (Ó Catháin). 
3. The organization of knowledge and reasoning 
Aristotle draws a parallel between dialectical logic and rhetoric. He states that where the former uses induction 
and the syllogism, rhetoric uses example and enthymeme2, example corresponding to inductive and enthymeme 
corresponding to deductive. “When we base the proof of a proposition on a number of similar cases, this is induction 
in dialectic, example in rhetoric; when it is shown that, certain propositions being true, a further and quite distinct 
proposition must also be true in consequence, whether invariably or usually, this is called syllogism in dialectic, 
enthymeme in rhetoric.” (Rapp, 2002). 
Writing about common sense as a tool of reasoning Lonergan (1957) says that there is certain communal 
knowledge shared among ordinary people; that they can reason and make judgements about practical affairs; that 
they can have a high probability of being right in their particular deliberations. But because of the certainty that 
comes from deductive methods, and the standing of science in the modern world, many people have been under the 
illusion that the only certain knowledge is scientific knowledge, and that all other knowledge is inferior to it.3  If 
reasoning is not deductive, that does not mean that it cannot be rational or logical or indeed practical. This kind of 
reasoning is widely employed in rhetoric. Aristotle’s section on ‘relative expediency’ below gives an exhaustive list 
of cases. 
TRIZ is essentially a system for organising human knowledge to facilitate creativity and retrieval. It has been 
devised in such a way that users can access relevant knowledge even in areas previously unknown to them. Whereas 
TRIZ developed out of technical systems, rhetoric is concerned with human nature, as the importance given to the 
three aspects of ethos, logos and pathos has already attested above.  Both TRIZ and rhetoric also extend to taking 
human behaviour into account. In a similar way, rhetoric organises human knowledge for its purpose: it is, in the 
words of Aristotle, “the technique of discovering the persuasive aspects of any given subject-matter.” (Aristotle: 
Lawson-Tancred, 1991, p65).  
After setting out the most important subjects to be mastered by the orator, Aristotle4 then describes deliberative 
rhetoric which as will be seen has close similarities to TRIZ in its organisational approach. “The business of 
deliberation and advice is to present the advocated course of action as likely to promote some desired end, so that by 
investigating the ends of conduct, those things which men tend to seek out, that we will discover the sources of 
 
2 A syllogism where one part of the argument - thought to be so obvious as not to need stating - is missing. 
3 The extreme positivism of Lord Kelvin is an example of this position. 
4 This paper does not presume to précis the work of the great man: it uses parallels where it finds them. 
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deliberative persuasiveness.” (Aristotle: Lawson-Tancred, p86). Aristotle goes on to discuss the components of 
happiness: 
y good birth 
y wealth 
y good repute 
y honour 
y health 
y good old age 
y friends 
y good fortune 
y virtue 
Some of the above are subdivided some into further elements in the course of the discussion. 
Of course these are mostly not under the control of the individual. “One does not deliberate about whether, but 
about how, to be happy.” (Lawson-Tancred, p91).  What should be done to promote happiness? Aristotle again: 
“Now the political or deliberative orator's aim is utility: deliberation seeks to determine not ends but the means to 
ends, i.e. what it is most useful to do. Further, utility is a good thing. We ought therefore to assure ourselves of the 
main facts about Goodness and Utility in general. We may define a good thing as that which ought to be chosen for 
its own sake; or as that for the sake of which we choose something else …” (Aristotle: Rapp).  The Good and the 
Expedient are then discussed. Some are further subdivided. 
y self-sufficiency 
y a greater in lieu of a lesser good 
y the virtues 
y happiness 
y virtues of the soul 
y virtues of the body 
y wealth 
y friendship 
y recognition 
y verbal and practical capacity 
y native wit 
y being alive 
y justice 
Aristotle’s next section on ‘relative expediency’ provides reasons and thus arguments for preferring one thing to 
another. 
y if the greatest advantage of one kind exceeds that of another 
y when a accompanies b, but not b a 
y things that exceed by more are greater 
y that whose productive cause is greater 
y the eligible in itself more then the not eligible in itself 
y if one thing were to be an end and the other not 
y what needs less of some other thing 
y when one thing does not exist or cannot come into existence without a second 
y what is relatively rarer 
y what is harder 
y that is the greater good whose contrary is the greater evil 
y things whose functions are more or less noble are greater goods 
y those things are greater goods, superiority in which is more desirable or honourable 
y the excess of better things are better 
y a thing is more honourable or better than another if it is more honourable to desire it 
y things of which the sciences are nobler or more serious 
y the properties of better men 
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y what the better man would choose 
y the more pleasant is greater than the less pleasant 
y the nobler is greater than the less noble 
y those things also are greater goods which men desire more earnestly 
y longer-lasting things are better than shorter-lived ones 
y what all choose is greater than what not all choose 
y that is the better thing which is considered so by competitors or enemies 
y things that are more praised 
y things for which the punishments are greater are greater evils 
y things that are better than others admitted or believed to be good 
y the same effect is produced  by piling up facts in a climax 
y the home-grown is better than the acquired 
y the best part of a good thing is particularly good 
y things more needed are more useful 
y of two things that which leads more directly to the end in view is the better 
y the possible rather than the impossible 
y those things which are of service when the need is pressing 
y what aims at reality is better than what aims at appearance 
y all things that we wish to be rather than to seem 
y things more useful for many purposes 
y what is relatively painless and produces pleasure 
y of two things that which added to the original makes the whole greater 
y things whose presence is noticed rather than not 
y that which is dearly prized is better than what is not 
These arguments are directly applicable to design, and display the sort of reasoning often used intuitively by 
designers, especially where quantities are not involved. In some cases what this list brings out is not perhaps so 
much the designer’s brief as the flavour of the advertising world with its promise of the good life obtainable from 
consuming.  
4. Concluding observations 
Lonergan’s analysis makes it plain that the kind of commonsense knowledge just described and codified for 
practical use by Aristotle is not only equal in value to deductive knowledge, but also a necessary part of scientific 
progress.  
“To regard them as rivals or competitors is a mistake, for essentially they are partners and it 
is their successful co-operation that constitutes applied science and technology, that adds 
invention to scientific discoveries, that supplements inventions with organisations, know-how, 
and specialized skills.”  (Lonergan, 1957, p298) 
It is clear that the kinds of deliberative rhetorical reasoning needed for deciding future actions are exactly the 
same as those needed by designers when designing, and by consumers when evaluating existing designs. “The 
problem … is not the construction of the arguments but rather the initial discovery of these premises. For this 
activity rhetorical tradition has the technical concept of invention and invention can be said to be the primary subject 
of Aristotle’s Rhetoric. … The Rhetoric might indeed be called an encyclopaedia of invention.” (Lawson-Tancred, 
p19). 
“Usually TRIZ thought has been seen as a ‘product’ of the laws of dialectics by Marx and 
Engels who, in turn, used Hegel's metaphysical dialectics as a basis for their advancement. ”  
(Anon., 2006).  
Although he was born in 1926 it is tempting to speculate that Altschuller, the founder of TRIZ, may have had 
some exposure to Aristotelian ideas. Even if he did not, there is still a debt to Aristotle, as can be inferred from this 
comment on Hegel's work, 
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“Hegel came to be one of the main targets of attack by the founders of the emerging ‘analytic’ 
movement, Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore. For Russell, the revolutionary innovations in 
logic starting in the last decades of the nineteenth century had destroyed Hegel's metaphysics by 
overturning the Aristotelian logic on which it was based  …   .”  (Redding, 2006). 
It is not being suggested here that there is any straightforward mapping between Rhetoric and TRIZ. It is only 
part of the story. The core of TRIZ is the identification of contradictions. But Altschuller did not invent this idea: it 
is precisely the method of Dialectic used by Aristotle and many others. The identification of a contradiction leads to 
a new formulation. Aristotle states that Rhetoric is a counterpart to Dialectic: they are tools to be used as 
appropriate.  
This paper has no more than scratched the surface of the subject, but it is clear that, just as TRIZ makes extensive 
use of lists (usually) backed up by scientific knowledge, rhetoric also makes extensive use of lists backed up by 
practical advice on how to choose arguments tailored to the particular circumstances and audience or user. The 
Rhetoric, backed up by Aristotle’s great corpus of other writings, makes a formidable system, in his words,  “to deal 
with things about which we deliberate, but for which we have no systematic rules.”  Hence it offers designers a way 
of practical reasoning about issues during the process of design. 
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